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2 
As part of the Paris Agreement, China pledged to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030. In 1 
retrospect, the commitment may have been fulfilled as it was being made: China’s 2 
emissions peaked in 2013 at a level of 9.53 Gigatons of CO2, and declined in each year 3 
from 2014 to 2016. However, the prospect for maintenance of the continued reductions 4 
depend the relative contributions of different changes in China. Here we quantitatively 5 
evaluate the drivers of the peak and decline of China’s CO2 emissions between 2007 and 6 
2016 using the latest available energy, economic, and industry data. We find that 7 
slowing economic growth in China has it easier to reduce emissions. Nevertheless, the 8 
decline is largely associated with changes in industrial structure and a decline in the 9 
share of coal used for energy. Decreasing energy intensity (energy per unit GDP) and 10 
emissions intensity (emissions per unit energy) also contributed to the decline. Based on 11 
an econometric (cumulative sum) test, we confirm that there is a clear structural break 12 
in China’s emission pattern from 2015. We conclude that the decline of Chinese 13 
emissions is structural and is likely to be sustained if the nascent industrial and energy 14 
system transitions continue.  15 
 16 
 17 
3 
China is the top CO2-emitting nation, with emissions making up nearly a third (29.5%) of 18 
the global total in 2015 1. For this reason, international efforts to stabilize the Earth’s climate 19 
depend heavily upon the trajectory of Chinese emissions, and the country’s recent pledge to 20 
reduce its annual emissions before 2030 has been widely celebrated 2,3. Now, it is becoming 21 
clear that China may have already fulfilled this commitment: estimates made by various 22 
organizations indicate that—after more than decade of rapid growth—China’s annual CO2 23 
emissions have decreased year-on-year over the period 2013-2016.  24 
Although undoubtedly a watershed event, the peak of Chinese emissions prompts 25 
important questions about what factors are driving the current decrease, their relative 26 
importance, and whether or not the decline can be sustained or even accelerated. In particular, 27 
if China’s emissions are have fallen primarily as a result of slowing economic activity, as 28 
happened in the U.S. during the global financial crisis 4, renewed economic growth could 29 
reverse the decrease 5,6. 30 
Here, we assess the drivers of Chinese emissions from 2007-2016. Details of the analytical 31 
approach and data sources are provided in the Methods section below and Supplementary 32 
Information (SI). In summary, we update emissions inventories for China for 2000-2016 33 
using the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) sectoral approach 7 and the 34 
most recently published and revised statistics from Chinese government Yearbooks. This was 35 
necessary to ensure consistency and sufficient sectoral detail, and because the underlying 36 
Chinese data has been repeatedly updated and revised. We use Index Decomposition Analysis 37 
(IDA) to quantitatively evaluate the relative influence of eight socioeconomic factors on 38 
China’s energy-related emissions. We then perform a cumulative sum test to investigate 39 
whether there has been any structural change in China’s recent emissions patterns.  40 
Trends in China’s emissions, energy consumption and economic activity. The red curve 41 
in Fig.1a shows our estimates of Chinese emissions from 2000-2016, with other curves 42 
exhibiting similar emissions similar trends from five other prominent sources for comparison 43 
(see Methods for a more detailed comparison). China’s emissions grew at an average annual 44 
rate of 9.3% between 2000 and 2013, from ~3.0 Gt in 2000 to a peak of 9.5 Gt CO2 in 2013 45 
(Fig. 1a). Emissions then declined by 1.0%, 1.8% and 0.4% in 2014, 2015 and 2016, 46 
respectively, reaching 9.2 Gt CO2 in 2016 (8.5 Gt from fossil fuel combustion and 0.7 Gt 47 
from industrial processes). 48 
Fig.1b shows contemporaneous trends in China’s economic growth (green curve) and 49 
carbon intensity (purple curve): GDP growth has been rapid and monotonic, outpacing the 50 
growth of CO2 emissions since 2007. As a result, the carbon intensity of the Chinese economy 51 
declined by 27% between 2000-2016 (Fig. 1b). As we will show, such decreases in emissions 52 
intensity hint at the underlying changes in China’s industrial structure and energy efficiency. 53 
Meanwhile, Figure 1C shows that China’s energy consumption has continued to increase over 54 
the same period, but at a decelerated rate after 2011. Moreover, energy from fossil fuels 55 
(areas shaded red, orange and yellow in Fig. 1c) has been essentially flat since emissions 56 
peaked in 2013, and the increase in total consumption 2014-2016 has been met by non-fossil 57 
sources (green shading in Fig. 1c). 58 
Based on our decomposition analysis, Fig. 2 shows the relative and absolute contribution 59 
of each of eight socioeconomic factors on Chinese energy-related CO2 emissions: (1) 60 
population growth (dark blue); (2) economic growth (green); changes in the shares of Chinese 61 
energy supplied by (3) coal (light blue), (4) natural gas (yellow), and (5) oil (purple); (6) 62 
changes in the quality of fossil fuels burned (i.e. fuel-specific changes in CO2 emissions per 63 
4 
unit energy; orange); (7) changes in energy intensity (i.e. energy consumed per unit of GDP; 64 
red); and (8) changes in industrial structure (i.e. the relative contributions of different types of 65 
industry to GDP). In order to facilitate presentation and discussion, we subdivide the results 66 
from 2007-2016 into three 3-year periods. 67 
Growing emissions 2007-2010 and 2010-2013. Between 2007 and 2013, the 40.9% 68 
increase in Chinese emissions was dominated by strong economic growth (Fig. 2, green bars), 69 
which—in the absence of other factors—would have caused emissions to increase by 29.3% 70 
and 24.6% during the periods 2007-2010 and 2010-2013, respectively. The next most 71 
important driver of increasing emissions during this time frame was the increasing quality of 72 
fuels, and particularly coal, being burned in China (Fig. 2, orange bars). Higher quality coal 73 
(i.e., anthracite) contains greater carbon by mass, which results in more CO2 emissions per ton 74 
of fuel burned than does lower quality coal (i.e., brown coal) 7. Independent of other factors, 75 
changes in fuel quality led to emissions increases of 12.5% and 5.4% during the periods 2007-76 
2010 and 2010-2013, respectively. Population growth also pushed Chinese emissions upward 77 
steadily during these time periods, by 1.6% in both 2007-2010 and 2010-2013 (Fig. 2, blue 78 
bars). Changes in the share of energy provided by oil and natural gas also caused small 79 
increases in emissions 2007-2010 and 2010-2013, respectively (Fig. 2, purple and yellow 80 
bars). 81 
During 2007-2013, when total Chinese emissions were increasing, several factors also 82 
acted to decrease emissions, effectively restraining the growth rate. Between 2007-2010, the 83 
most important of these was changes in energy intensity (energy consumed per unit GDP), 84 
which—in the absence of other factors—would have caused emissions to decrease by 15.4% 85 
(Fig. 2, red bars). Although changing energy intensity continued to suppress emissions growth 86 
between 2010 and 2013, its influence during those years waned substantially, to a 3.2% 87 
decrease. Conversely, changes in China’s industrial structure accounted for only a modest 88 
decreasing force 2007-2010 (1.1%), but gained strength over the period 2010-2013, when it 89 
drove emissions down by 7.3% (Fig. 2, pink bars). Decreases in the share of China’s energy 90 
derived from coal also acted to reduce emissions by 6.2% and 1.1% during the periods 2007-91 
2010 and 2010-2013, respectively (Fig. 2, light blue bars). Similar changes in the share of 92 
energy provided by natural gas and oil were responsible for small declines in emissions over 93 
2007-2010 and 2010-2013, respectively (Fig. 2, yellow and purple bars). 94 
Decreasing emissions 2013-2016. Chinese CO2 emissions have declined since 2013 and a 95 
cumulative sum (cusum) test indicates that this decline is a structural change (Fig.1d and 96 
Supplementary Table 3). We examined the energy related industrial emissions from 2000 to 97 
2016. Although the emissions show turning points around both 2008 and 2013, the cusum test 98 
suggests that only the change from 2015 (at 95% condifence intervel) is structurally 99 
significant. This evidence of structural change reflects changes in the driving forces during 100 
2013-2016 having a more significant impact on the change in industrial CO2 emissions than 101 
that in other periods. Between 2013 and 2016, the 4.2% decrease in Chinese emissions was 102 
driven by the combination of changes in industrial structure, and further decreases in both the 103 
share of energy derived from coal and the energy intensity of China’s economy (Fig. 2, pink, 104 
light blue, and red bars, respectively). In the absence of other factors, these three factors 105 
would have caused emissions over 2013-2016 to decrease by 10.0%, 7.8%, and 5.1%, 106 
respectively (22.9% in total). In addition, Chinese economic growth 2013-2016 was 107 
somewhat slower than in the previous analyzed periods, driving emissions up by 18.2% (6.4% 108 
less than in the period 2010-2013; green bars in Fig. 2). 2013-2016 population growth 109 
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continued to push emissions upward at the same pace as in the two previous 3-year periods 110 
(1.6%; blue bars in Fig. 2), and changes in the share of energy derived from natural gas and 111 
oil exerted a very small influence (+0.1% and -0.2%, respectively; yellow and purple bars in 112 
Fig. 2). Finally, the quality of fuels being burned in China declined over 2013-2016, 113 
contributing to a small decrease in overall emissions (1.0%; orange bar in Fig. 2). 114 
Fig. 3 reveals further details underlying the decreases due to changes in industrial 115 
structure, coal consumption, and energy intensity during 2013-2016. Fig. 3a highlights the 116 
shift in China’s industrial outputs over 2013-2016, away from energy- and emissions-117 
intensive manufacturing towards higher value-added (e.g., high technology) manufacturing 118 
and services. Such high-technology manufacturing and services have been the main source of 119 
growth in the Chinese economy in recent years, accounting for 71.9% of total value added in 120 
2016, up from 64.4% in 2007. Service industries’ value added increased from 46.9% of 121 
national GDP in 2013 to 50.5% in 2015 and 51.6% in 2016, thus reaching its largest 122 
proportion of the Chinese economy since 1952. Meanwhile, output from China’s heavy 123 
industry has declined progressively, decreasing at an annual rate of 2.7% prior to 2013 and 124 
accelerating to an average annual decrease of 6.9% 2013-2016 8. 125 
Fig. 3b reveals the sectors that have accounted for the drop in Chinese coal consumption 126 
over 2013-2016. Whereas coal consumption in China grew by an average of 6.6% per year 127 
between 2007 and 2013, supporting a tremendous expansion of capital infrastructure, coal 128 
consumption peaked at 4.2 Gt in 2013 and declined by an average of 5.6% per year 2013-129 
2016. The largest decreases in coal consumption occurred in the electricity sector, which 130 
accounted for 81.7% of the total reduction between 2013 and 2016 (pink bar in Fig. 3b). 131 
Other energy-related sectors, the coal washing and coking, together accounted for 21% 132 
(purple and green bars in Fig. 3B, respectively).  133 
Importantly, the reduction in coal consumption occurred despite continued growth of total 134 
energy consumption by 2.2%, 0.9% and 1.1% in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively (Fig. 1c). 135 
As coal use decreased, rising energy demand was met by rapid growth of renewable and 136 
nuclear energy, which increased at an average annual rate of 10.5% per year 2007-2013, and 137 
11% 2013-2016. Although increasing from a small base (8% of total energy consumed in 138 
2002), persistently high growth rates have led to non-fossil fuel energy supplying 13.3% of 139 
China’s energy in 2016. Meanwhile, coal’s share in the energy mix was essentially constant at 140 
~68% 2007-2013, then dropping to 62% in 2016 (Fig. 1c). 141 
The structural trends in China’s economy have been reinforced by contemporaneous 142 
improvements in efficiency and thereby decreasing energy intensity. Fig. 3 shows some of the 143 
sectoral changes between 2013 and 2016. In particular, output from the metal products, 144 
coking, and chemical products sectors decreased while “other industries” (including the high 145 
technology and service industries) increased substantially (Fig. 3a). Also shown, the 146 
decreases in coal consumption over this timespan were largely in the electricity and coal 147 
washing sectors, with modest increases in consumption by the “other industries” and chemical 148 
products sectors (Fig. 3b). Finally, there were large decreases in energy per unit output of the 149 
“other industries”, cement, bricks, and glass, coal washing, and electricity sectors 2013-2016, 150 
offset to some extent by increases in the energy intensity of coking and metal products (Fig. 151 
3c). 152 
 153 
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Maintenance of the lower emissions. After nearly two decades of rapidly rising emissions, 154 
a changing industrial structure, shifting energy mix, improving energy efficiency, and 155 
economic deceleration caused Chinese emissions to peak at 9.5 Gt CO2 in 2013 and decline 156 
by 4.2% in the years since. As the world’s top emitting and manufacturing nation, this 157 
reversal is cause for cautious optimism among those seeking to stabilize the Earth’s climate. 158 
Although some emissions inventories show the peak occurring a year earlier or later, 159 
sensitivity testing of our decomposition analysis shows the relative contributions of the 160 
different drivers are consistent and robust (Fig. 2). Now, the important question is whether the 161 
decline in Chinese emissions will persist. 162 
On the one hand, commentators have argued that the timetable of China’s peak emissions 163 
pledge was not very ambitious 9,10. For example, Green and Stern (2016) 11 argue “China’s 164 
international commitment to peak emissions ‘around 2030’ should be seen as a highly 165 
conservative upper limit from a government that prefers to under-promise and over-deliver.” 166 
But on the other hand, a 2013 peak is far sooner than anyone thought possible when Chinese 167 
President Xi Jinping first made the pledge in 2014. 168 
Moreover, history suggests caution is warranted in concluding that the reversal in 169 
emissions will hold over the long term: Although the shift towards services and away from 170 
more energy-intensive manufacturing is unambiguous 11, China’s economic growth has 171 
decelerated twice before. Most recently, after double digit growth from 1992-1996, China’s 172 
economy slowed during the East Asian economic crisis, when growth fell to an average of 8% 173 
for the four years 1998-2001 before accelerating again by the mid-2000s. Similarly rapid 174 
economic growth in the mid-1980s dropped dramatically to 4% between 1989 and 1991 175 
before accelerating again in the 1990s 12. Chinese emissions were essentially flat in 2016 (-176 
0.4%), and—all other factors staying the same—a slight acceleration of economic growth 177 
(e.g., from 6.7% in 2015 to 7.1% in 2016) would have caused an increase in total emissions 178 
(in reality, the Chinese economy grew by 6.7% in 2016).   179 
The changes in China’s economic structure that have led to the recent decline are the result 180 
of consistent and strategic policies to improve industry structure 9,13,14, especially after 2010, 181 
which is consistent with previous studies15,16. More efforts have been made in recent years. 182 
From 2012 to 2015, China eliminated outdated capacity in 16 energy-intensive industries. For 183 
example, coal-fired power generation capacity declined by 21.1 GW (gigawatts), as well as 184 
reductions of 520 Mt (million tonnes) in coal production, 126 Mt in iron and steel processing 185 
and 500 Mt of cement 17. These structural changes have been reinforced by policies aimed at 186 
improving air quality and boosting deployment of low-carbon energy sources 18. For example, 187 
the Chinese government has strictly limited development of new coal-fired power plants since 188 
2013. Air quality policies have also encouraged more efficient use of coal, such as by phasing 189 
out older, smaller coal-fired power plants 18. 190 
However, recent progress in China, such as the retirement of small, old, and especially 191 
inefficient plants, offers a one-time decrease in emissions that is not easily repeated. The 192 
majority of coal-fired power plants now operating in China are large, modern power plants 193 
that have been built since the mid-1990s 19 and investments in coal-fired plant seem to have 194 
declined significantly from 2015 to 2017 20,21. Thus, further emissions reductions may 195 
increasingly depend on overcoming consider able infrastructural inertia by replacing valuable, 196 
young generators that burn coal with non-fossil electricity. Escaping carbon lock-in may 197 
therefore test the political will of China’s central government 22,23. 198 
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Nonetheless, government policies are a sign that the nascent decline in China’s emissions 199 
will continue. China’s seven local and regional pilot carbon market schemes will be replaced 200 
by a nationwide emissions trading scheme in 2018 24. China has also pledged to improve 201 
national energy intensity during 2015-2020 25, which will further translate to emissions 202 
reduction in coming years 25. Moreover, in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris 203 
Agreement, China has increasingly assumed a leadership role in climate change mitigation, 204 
and its five-year progress reports under the agreement will be heavily scrutinized by the rest 205 
of the world. 206 
Besides climate, energy security and public health goals will discourage coal consumption. 207 
Although China still produces almost 4 billion tons of coal a year (over three times that of the 208 
United States, the next largest producer), it also imports more coal than any other country, 209 
prompting concerns of energy independence and security 26. At the same time, rising incomes 210 
in major cities and concerns about the health impacts of poor air quality can be expected to 211 
close any remaining older coal-fired boilers and encourage a shift to natural gas, particularly 212 
in regions such as Southern and Eastern China that are both more affluent and more reliant on 213 
imported coal 27. 214 
Other policies cut in both directions. For example, the One Belt One Road policy 215 
emphasizes both public transport infrastructure and road transportation, and seeks to export 216 
coal technologies to neighbors such as Pakistan. As a result, growth in personal transportation 217 
could lead to large increases in emissions over the next decade (as evidenced by the growth in 218 
new and cheap produced SUV sales at recent low retailing prices)28. However, over the longer 219 
term, electric vehicles may avoid such emissions, assuming the availability of low-carbon 220 
electricity 29.  221 
China’s emissions may fluctuate in the coming years and that may mean that 2013 may not 222 
be the ‘final’ peak30. For example, extrapolating from data for the first six months of 2017, 223 
Jackson et al. argue that Chinese CO2 emissions (including cement) may rise for all of 2017 
31. 224 
However, the changes in industrial activities, coal use, and efficiency that have caused the 225 
recent decline have roots in the changing structure of China’s economy and long-term 226 
government policies. The recent Chinese policy directive to cap coal at 4 billion metric tonnes 227 
per year requires its proportion in the energy mix to decrease from 64% in 2015 to around 228 
58% by 2020. Such pressures suggest that the downward trend in emissions could persist as 229 
China’s economy shifts from heavy and low-value manufacturing to high-technology and 230 
service industries. Both emissions and their underlying drivers will need to be carefully 231 
monitored, but the fact that China’s emissions have decreased for several years—and more 232 
importantly the reasons why—give hope for further decreases going forward. 233 
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Figure captions 318 
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Figure 1. Temporal change of CO2 emissions and related indicators in China from 2000 to 2016. (a) Total 321 
carbon emissions from combustion of fossil fuels and cement production from different sources (EIA32 , IEA33 and 322 
BP 34 estimates exclude emissions from cement production); (b) GDP and CO2 emission intensity; (c) Total energy 323 
consumption by fuel; (d) Recursive cumulative sum plot of CO2 emissions from different sources. The recursive 324 
10 
cusum results for this study is the result of energy-related CO2 emissions. If the plot of the recursive cusum process 325 
crosses the confidence bands, indicating a significant structural break in that period. 326 
 327 
 328 
Figure 2. Contribution of each driver to the change in national CO2 emissions in the periods 2007-2010, 329 
2010-2013 and 2013-2016. The length of the bar reflects the contribution of each factor per year. The error bar of 330 
each column is based on the range of the decomposition results of emissions from EIA, IEA and BP statistics. 331 
11 
 332 
Figure 3. Sector-specific changes from 2013 to 2016 in China. (a) change in sectoral contribution to national 333 
GDP, (b) coal consumption and (c) energy intensity (energy per unit of output, unit: t/$). Different color bars 334 
represent the main contributing sectors. Percentage above each bar in (b) is the sectoral contribution to the total 335 
change in coal consumption from 2013 to 2016. 336 
 337 
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Methods 339 
Emissions Estimates and Data Sources. The national CO2 emissions used in this study 340 
include two parts: energy-related emissions (emissions from fossil fuel combustion), and 341 
process-related emissions (emissions from cement industry processes). According to the IPCC 342 
guidelines7, energy-related CO2 emissions equals to activity data (fossil fuel consumption) 343 
multiplied by parameters NCV, EF , and O , see equation (1) below. 344 
          345 
ij ij i i ijCE AD NCV EF O                                   (1) 346 
In the equation,  ijCE refers to the CO2 emissions by energy type ( i) and sector (j). The 347 
emissions are calculated by 17 different energy types (see Supplementary Table 1) and 47 348 
socioeconomic sectors (See Supplementary Table 2) in this study. 349 
 ijAD  (activity data) means to fossil fuel consumption by the corresponding energy types 350 
and sectors. Energy loss during transportation, energy processes, and input as raw materials in 351 
chemical process are exclude from the consumption as these part of energy use will not emit 352 
any CO2
35. All the data are collected from the most up-to-date energy balance tables and 353 
energy consumption by sectors published in Energy Statistical Yearbooks36.  354 
iNCV  in equation (1) refers to net caloric value, which is the heat value produced per 355 
physical unit of fossil fuel combusted. iEF  (emission factor) is the CO2 emissions per net 356 
caloric value produced for different fossil fuel types. ijO  is oxygenation efficiency, which 357 
refers to the oxidation ratio when burning fossil fuels. We consider different oxygenation 358 
efficiencies for fossil fuels used in different sectors, as the combustion technology levels 359 
differ by sector in China.  360 
All three parameters are collected based on our previous survey of China’s fossil fuel 361 
quality37 and assumed to be unchanged throughout the study period35,38. The emission factors 362 
of coal-related fuels are approximately 40% lower than the IPCC default value, while the oil- 363 
and gas-related fuels’ emission factors are close to the IPCC values. The oxygenation 364 
efficiencies are calculated based on the different combustion levels of China’s industrial 365 
sectors. The average oxygenation efficiency for coal-related fuels is 92%, lower than the 366 
values of 100% and 98% used by UN and IPCC. CEADs also employs the latest energy 367 
consumption data adjusted by NBS in 2014. The data adjustment in 2014 brings a 5% 368 
increase to the total CO2 emissions. The parameters in this study are now being widely used 369 
by the Chinese government in its recently released report on climate change 39. 370 
We calculate the process-related CO2 emissions (cement production) in equation (2). tCE   371 
refers to CO2 emission from cement production in China. The activity data ( tAD ) refers to 372 
cement production, which are collected from China’s statistical yearbook 2001-20178. The 373 
emission factor for cement production (
tEF ) is also collect from our previous research 
37. 374 
t t tCE AD EF                                                   (2) 375 
 376 
Decomposition analysis. Decomposition analysis (DA) methods have been used 377 
extensively to quantify the contribution of socioeconomic drivers to change in environmental 378 
i
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pressures 6,43-44. Two decomposition approaches are by far the most popular, namely, index 379 
decomposition analysis (IDA) and structural decomposition analysis (SDA). Compared with 380 
SDA, which is based on input–output coefficients and final demands from input–output 381 
tables, IDA is more suitable for time-series analysis using data with sufficient temporal and 382 
sectoral detail 45,46. The advantage of the IDA approach is that it can be easily applied to any 383 
data at any level of aggregation 47.  384 
Among specific IDA methodologies, the Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) has 385 
been shown by past studies to be preferable by virtue of its path independence, consistency in 386 
aggregation, and ability to handle zero values 48-50. As a result, many studies have used LMDI 387 
to provide policy-relevant insights, for instance by identifying driving forces of energy 388 
consumption 47,51,52 and changes in CO2 emissions 
53-56. The LMDI analysis compares a set of 389 
indices between the base and final year of a given period, and explores the effects of these 390 
indices on the trend of emissions over that period 47. See supplementary information for 391 
detailed calculation. 392 
In this study, we decompose the national energy-related industrial CO2 emissions (C) as: 393 
j j ij ij
ij j j ij ij
i j i j i jj j ij
G E E CG
C C P P Y S I M T
P G G E E
                   (3) 394 
where C represents national energy-related industrial CO2 emissions, ijC is the CO2 395 
emissions in sector j (where sector j=1,2,3,4 represents light industries, heavy industries, high 396 
technology industries and agricultural & service industries, see Supplementary Table 2 for 397 
sector definition) by fuel type i (where i=1,2,3 represents coal, oil, and natural gas, 398 
respectively), Gj is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of sector j，Eij is the consumption of fuel 399 
type i in sector j; Thus, according to equation (1), C is represented by six factors mentioned 400 
above: 401 
1）P is population； 402 
2） / PY G stands for GDP per capita and measures economic growth; 403 
3) /j iS G G is the sector j’s share of total GDP, represents the industrial structure;  404 
4)  /j j jI E G is energy intensity in sector j and measures the energy consumption per 405 
unit of GDP, which indicates the energy efficiency;  406 
5)  / Eij ij jM E is the proportion of fuel type i in sector j and represents the energy mix 407 
effect, M1, M2 and M3 in equation (4) describe the proportion of coal, oil and natural gas in the 408 
entire economy. The effect of non-fossil energy proportion is assessed to be zero. 409 
6)  / Eij ij ijT C is the emission intensity of fuel type i in sector j, reflecting changes of 410 
fuel carbon content upgrades (e.g. replacing brown coal by anthracite) within any broad fuel 411 
type (i.e. coal consumption). 17 types of fossil fuel are included in this study (Supplementary 412 
Table 1), which is aggregated into three categories (coal, oil and gas).  413 
Thus, the change of national CO2 emissions in year t compared with the year t-1 is 414 
calculated as 415 
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Here, 
1 1 1( , ) ( ) / (ln( ) ln( ))t t t t t tij ij ij ij ij ijL w w C C C C
     , is a weighting factor called the 417 
logarithmic mean weight. PC , YC , SC , IC , coalC , oilC , gasC and TC ,  are 418 
CO2 emission changes owing to population variation, economic growth, industrial structure 419 
adjustment, energy intensity effect, changes in the proportion of coal, oil, and natural gas 420 
consumption, and emission intensity change, respectively. The decomposition analysis with 421 
CO2 emissions estimated in this study is defined as the base decomposition. 422 
 423 
Sensitivity Test. To assess the extent to which different factors’ contributions are affected by 424 
national CO2 emissions, we conduct a sensitivity analysis which decomposes the emissions 425 
from the BP，IEA and EIA databases (Fig.1a). CO2 emissions from other data source are 426 
obtained from Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC)1; Emissions 427 
Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR)41; United Nations Framework 428 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)1,42; U.S. Energy Information Administration 429 
(EIA)32, International Energy Agency (IEA)33 and British Petroleum (BP)34.The national 430 
fossil fuel emissions for the different data sources are given by CBP, CIEA and CEIA 431 
respectively. Then they were split into different fuel types in different sectors (Cij) with the 432 
share (Cij/C) in the base decomposition. The decomposition 1(CBP), decomposition 2 (CEIA) 433 
and decomposition 3 (CIEA) are conducted with the same Eij , Ej and P in the base 434 
decomposition. The range of results of decompositions 1, 2 and 3 are shown as error bars in 435 
Fig.2. 436 
Cumulative sum (cusum) test. We use an econometric approach to investigate whether a 437 
structural break of energy- related carbon emissions had occurred in the industrial sector over 438 
2000-2016. The occurrence of structural break is examined using the cumulative sum (cusum) 439 
test introduced by Brown et al.57 and Ploberger and Krämer58 440 
 441 
We model the total energy-related CO2 emissions as a function of its first-order lag as 442 
follows: 443 
𝐶𝑂2𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝐶𝑂2𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡                𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇                      (3) 444 
Where 𝛽𝑡 is a vector of time-varying parameters and 𝑒𝑡 is an independent and identically 445 
normally distributed error term. The null hypothesis for the test of parameter stability is H0: 446 
𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽, which is interpreted as the parameter 𝛽 is constant over time. Under the null 447 
hypothesis, the recursive residuals are assumed to be independent and identically distributed 448 
as N(0,s e
3), and the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals also has a mean of zero. The 449 
formula for the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals can be found in Brown et al.57. 450 
16 
The null hypothesis can be rejected if the cusum statistic is larger than a critical value at 451 
90%, 95%, or 99%. Once the null hypothesis is rejected, it implies that there exists a 452 
structural break during this period. 453 
 454 
Data availability. The original data that support the findings of this study can be freely downloaded 455 
from the China Emission Accounts and Datasets (CEADS) website (http://www.ceads.net/). The data 456 
descriptor has been published on Scientific data to facilitate reuse 40. 457 
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